Introduction
This study uses Snow's 1978 and organizational strategy typology to examine whether companies that follow different business strategies exhibit differences in the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities and whether firms' business strategies are a factor in determining the audit effort necessary to attest to the firms' financial statements. By exploring the extent to which firms following particular business strategies are more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities, we provide evidence that increases our understanding of the underlying determinants of financial reporting quality. By examining the relation between business strategy and audit effort, we also provide evidence on the extent to which audit firms appear to incorporate business strategy in developing their audit planning. We develop a measure of business strategy based on Snow 1978 and and test the association between this business strategy measure and several proxies for financial reporting irregularities as well as its contribution to an audit fee model generated from prior literature.
Investigating the extent to which firms that follow particular business strategies are more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities is consistent with a call for research in Zahra, Priem, and Rasheed 2005 (813) who suggest that "accounting research, by and large, has focused on identifying potential indicators or 'red flags' rather than establishing direct causes or antecedents [of misreporting]". We discuss the business risks of certain business strategies in the context of SAS No. 99 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA] 2002) in order to describe how business strategy may be an underlying determinant of both the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities and additional effort by auditors in the attestation of financial statements.
Considering business strategy and its association with audit effort is also timely in the context of AU 311 (AICPA 2006) , which refers to the need for auditors to understand the client's industry and business in planning an audit, and ISA 315 (International Federation of Accountants [IFAC] 2009), which emphasizes a business risk assessment in the audit planning phase and directs auditors to obtain an understanding of "the entity's objectives and strategies, and those related business risks that may result in risks of material misstatement" (ISA 315.11(d) ). In addition, AS No. 5 has encouraged auditors to take a top-down, risk-based approach to internal control audits, which are scaled in relation to the client's size and complexity (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2007). AS No. 5 emphasizes a "risk-based approach" because "the size and complexity of the company, its business processes, and business units, may affect the way in which the company achieves many of its control objectives" (PCAOB 2007, AS 5.13 ). Thus, this study provides evidence on whether business strategy, a contributing factor in the size and complexity of the company and its business processes, is associated with varying degrees of audit effort as reflected in an audit fee model. Snow (1978, 2003) detail three viable business strategies that may exist simultaneously within industries-Prospectors, Defenders, and Analyzers-where the key dimension of the strategy typology is the organization's rate of change regarding its products and markets (Hambrick 1983) .
1 These strategies are positioned along a continuum, with prospectors at one end and defenders at the other. Prospectors rapidly change their productmarket mix to be innovative market leaders in numerous domains, while defenders maintain a narrow and stable product focus to compete on the basis of price, service, or quality Snow 1978, 2003) . Firms that constitute the middle of the continuum are analyzers, which have attributes of both prospectors and defenders Snow 1978, 2003) . Consistent with prior research in both management and accounting (e.g., Hambrick 1981 Hambrick , 1983 Simons 1987; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997) , we focus on the two distinct strategies at the ends of the continuum, prospectors and defenders. Appendix 1 provides a more detailed description of both the prospector and defender strategies.
Our main findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, the odds of experiencing an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER), lawsuit, or restatement are 2.32, 1.10, and 0.47 times higher, respectively, for firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for prospectors relative to firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for defenders. In addition, we find that, ceteris paribus, firms at the cutoff for prospectors will pay audit fees approximately 22 percent higher than firms at the cutoff for defenders, suggesting that auditors incorporate a company's business strategy in their audit plan and that audit effort varies across business strategies. We examine several possible explanations for why prospectors experience a greater likelihood of irregularities despite the apparent increase in auditor effort. Our findings suggest that the higher audit fees (and hence higher audit effort) for prospectors are insufficient to address the riskiness of these clients. Additional sensitivity tests suggest that our strategy measure captures client business risk and that the observed increase in audit effort for prospector firms is incremental to effects related to financial reporting risk or other risk-based measures used in the audit fee literature. Specifically, business strategy is positive and significant in the audit fee model in the presence of financial reporting risk factors, and it is distinct from measures commonly used to explain the distribution of audit fees. Together, this evidence suggests our measure of business strategy is a separate construct providing incremental information content beyond traditional measures of client size, risk, and complexity.
Our study links three research literatures: organizational theory from the management literature, and financial reporting quality and audit effort from the accounting literature. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we develop a comprehensive measure for organizational business strategy that is generalizable across industries and easily replicable. Second, while prior accounting research has examined business strategy as a determinant of compensation (Ittner et al. 1997) , accounting control systems (Simons 1987) , budgetary usage (Collins, Holzmann, and Mendoza 1997) and in contemporaneous research as a determinant of tax 1. Snow (1978, 2003) indicate that, although a fourth business strategy exists (Reactors), this strategy is not viable in the long term and is often difficult to identify. Thus, we focus on the viable strategies.
aggressiveness (Higgins, Omer, and Phillips 2011) , we contribute to this line of research by providing evidence that business strategy has an even broader application to financial reporting and auditing than previously considered. Third, by relying on organizational theory to categorize companies and their associated business risk, we develop a better understanding of the factors that are ex ante determinants of financial reporting irregularities. Finally, our results provide evidence that auditors, consistent with authoritative guidance, appear to take a broader, more comprehensive approach in assessing their audit clients' business risk than what has been represented in the literature using traditional proxies such as client size and complexity. However, improving audits to reduce financial reporting irregularities among prospector clients appears to be an important area for audit practice and future research. The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses Snow's 1978 and business strategy types, and section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our measures and models. Section 5 describes our data. Section 6 describes our empirical results, while section 7 presents additional analyses. Section 8 concludes.
Business strategy
The management literature provides several typologies of business strategy that describe how companies compete in their respective market environments. Some of the more wellknown typologies, in addition to Miles and Snow 1978 , include: Porter 1980 , who describes business strategies in terms of cost leadership and product differentiation; March 1991 , who describes business strategies in terms of exploration and exploitation; and Treacy and Wiersema 1995, who describe business strategies in terms of operational excellence, product leadership, and customer intimacy. While the labels for business strategies differ across the various typologies, a common feature of all the proposed strategy classifications is that they most clearly identify companies that operate at one end or the other of a strategy continuum (Dent 1990; Langfield-Smith 1997; Seifzadeh 2011) . Thus, while each typology makes some attempt to classify companies that operate under a mixed strategy, these mixed strategies generally exhibit, to varying degrees, the characteristics of companies at both ends of the strategy continuum.
Although Miles and Snow's theory proposes four business strategies (three of which are viable), consistent with prior research in management and accounting we focus our discussion on the two distinct strategies that comprise the endpoints of their strategy continuum. Miles and Snow refer to these companies as prospectors and defenders.
2 The characteristics of prospectors and defenders are common to the business strategies suggested by Porter, Treacy and Wiersema, and March (Dent 1990; Langfield-Smith 1997; Seifzadeh 2011 We select the Miles and Snow classification for two reasons. First, given the commonalities across the various business strategy typologies noted above, inferences based on Miles and Snow are likely to align with inferences based on the other classifications. Second and more importantly, while the Miles and Snow typology can be operationalized using archival data (e.g., Ittner et al. 1997) , the other typologies require personal interviews and surveys of corporate officers. Thus, our methodology produces a replicable measure of business strategy that allows us to generalize our results to a broad cross-section of companies and industries. We note that much of the detailed discussion of prospectors and defenders below is transferable to the business strategies proposed by alternative theories. Snow (1978, 2003) define prospectors as innovative companies seeking to identify and exploit new products and market opportunities; thus, prospectors have budgets that are oriented toward research and development (R&D) and marketing. This focus on innovation requires prospectors to develop multiple technologies for a diverse product mix. Technological flexibility allows prospectors to respond rapidly to change, but it also comes at the cost of rarely achieving maximum efficiency in their production and distribution. Because prospectors grow through product and market development, Snow (1978, 2003) suggest that growth may occur in spurts. In order to facilitate and coordinate prospectors' diverse and numerous operations, control is decentralized; however, Snow (1978, 2003) highlight the transitory nature of the "dominant coalition", which lends itself to organizational instability. Prospectors avoid lengthy commitments to a single technological process by maintaining a low degree of mechanization or routinization and by leveraging the knowledge and skills of their employees. Snow (1978, 2003) define defenders as companies focused on efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and services. Due to their narrow market focus, defenders develop closely related products and services rather than pursuing new product and market opportunities, which limits their product development efforts. Defenders "protect" the finance and production functions compared to prospectors' efforts to "protect" the marketing and research and development functions. Unlike prospectors, defenders grow cautiously and incrementally through market penetration and hence demonstrate low, steady growth. Defenders are characterized as maintaining strict centralized organizational control to ensure efficiency; Snow (1978, 2003) indicate that these companies tend to have lengthy employee tenure and promote from within. Achieving production and distribution efficiency requires defenders to invest heavily in technological efficiency, which includes focusing on "single core" cost-efficient technology and continual improvement leading to routinization and mechanization.
In the next section we develop our hypotheses about how these business strategies relate to both financial reporting irregularities and audit effort.
Hypothesis development
Business strategy, business risk, and financial reporting irregularities Consistent with prior research (e.g., Johnstone 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Stanley 2011) , we define client business risk as "the risk that the audit client's economic condition will deteriorate in the future" (Stanley 2011: 157) . The auditor's assessment of client business risk critically impacts audit planning and effort due to its link to both audit risk (i.e., the risk that an unqualified audit opinion is issued for a set of materially misstated financial statements) and auditor business risk (i.e., the auditor's risk of loss in connection with the audited financial statements-e.g., due to litigation, loss of reputation, etc.).
3 SAS No. 99 considers fraud in the context of a financial statement audit, and its framework is applicable to the broader set of financial reporting irregularities we examine in this study. Specifically, the framework suggests that three factors are usually present when financial reporting irregularities occur: incentive, opportunity, and rationalization (AICPA 2002) . Prior literature (see Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, and Velury 2008) has provided substantial empirical evidence on the first two risk factors (incentive and opportunity); hence, we organize our discussion around these two factors. 4 
3.
Refer to Johnstone and Bedard 2003 for a thorough discussion.
4.
Although the SAS No. 99 framework suggests three factors are present when financial reporting irregularities occur, we do not explore the rationalization factor because the literature does not provide a reasonable archival proxy for this factor. Using survey data, Bentley (2012) develops a measure that proxies for rationalization of financial statement irregularities in the context of business strategies.
Incentives
Prior research suggests the likelihood that firms engage in financial reporting irregularities increases with such incentive factors as "rapid growth, compensation incentives, stock options, the need for financing, and poor performance" (Hogan et al. 2008: 246) . Regarding growth patterns, SAS No. 99 indicates that "rapid growth ...especially compared to that of other companies in the same industry" creates an incentive for companies to misstate their financial results (AU 316.85 [AICPA 2002]) . Prospectors display rapid and sporadic growth patterns, which stem from being innovative and "first to market" in a broad array of product-market domains Snow 1978, 2003) . Conversely, defenders display cautious and incremental growth patterns where they grow primarily through market penetration of their narrowly focused product line Snow 1978, 2003) . Thus in light of SAS No. 99 and prior research , prospectors have a greater risk of financial misreporting due to their rapid and sporadic growth tendencies compared to defenders. SAS No. 99 suggests that firms that base a significant portion of managements' remuneration (e.g., bonuses or stock options) on achieving aggressive performance targets have greater incentives to misreport (AICPA 2002) . In particular, prior research has linked stock-option-based compensation to greater occurrences of financial misreporting (e.g., Beneish 1999; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007) . Snow (1978, 2003) suggest that business strategy impacts reward structures, and prior research provides support for reward structure differences between prospectors and defenders (Ittner et al. 1997; Rajagopalan 1997; Singh and Agrawal 2002) .
Prospectors' focus on innovation produces greater outcome uncertainty and thus requires compensation contracts that not only encourage risk-taking but also take a longer-term perspective, allowing innovative ideas to yield profitable results (Rajagopalan 1997) . Rajagopalan (1997) and Singh and Agrawal (2002) find that prospectors emphasize long-term, stock-based compensation incentives (e.g., stock options) to encourage risk-taking behavior in managers. In addition, Singh and Agrawal (2002) indicate that, relative to defenders, prospectors' compensation packages are less likely to emphasize a fixed pay component (e.g., salary) and note that in some prospector firms the entire compensation package relies solely on the firm's market performance (i.e., there was no annual compensation component). Similarly, Simons (1987) reports that prospectors, relative to defenders, have a larger percentage of managers' total remuneration linked to aggressive performance bonuses. Altogether, prospectors' compensation arrangements appear to provide stronger incentives for management to misreport financial results because prospectors base a larger proportion of management's remuneration on stock-based compensation, which prior research links to greater occurrences of financial misreporting (e.g., Beneish 1999; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007 ).
On the other hand, defenders' focus on efficiency (e.g., to compete on the basis of product cost) produces less outcome uncertainty and allows compensation contracts to take a shorter-term perspective (Rajagopalan 1997) . Rajagopalan (1997) and Singh and Agrawal (2002) find that defenders emphasize short-term performance targets, which are often based on meeting accounting benchmarks (e.g., return on assets). Ittner et al. (1997) find that defenders place more weight on financial performance measures in chief executive officer bonus contracts when compared to prospectors. Thus, defenders' compensation packages also provide incentives for managers to misreport financial results because of their strong focus on meeting shorter-term accounting performance benchmarks (Ittner et al. 1997; Rajagopalan 1997; Singh and Agrawal 2002 Thus, the performance-related incentive factors highlighted in SAS No. 99 tie directly into the concept of business risk-i.e., the risk that a company's economic condition will deteriorate sometime in the future (Johnstone 2000; Stanley 2011) .
Prospectors' tendency to continually seek new and innovative product and market opportunities requires them to invest heavily in R&D activities, giving them greater need for financing but also leaving them vulnerable to overextending their resources and increasing their risk of incurring losses Snow 1978, 2003) . On the other hand, defenders engage in minimal R&D activity because they focus on producing a stable and narrow product line efficiently, where their cost reduction strategy reduces the risk of overextending their resources and encountering losses Snow 1978, 2003) . There is some empirical support regarding the lower profitability tendencies of prospectors relative to defenders. For example, Ittner et al. (1997) find that prospectors are positively associated with financial distress, while Hambrick (1983) finds that prospectors have significantly lower operating cash flow and return on investment (ROI) ratios compared to defenders. Thus, prospectors' exposure to lower profitability and their need to obtain financing for their extensive R&D activities suggest they represent greater business risk and may be more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities.
Opportunities
SAS No. 99 indicates that opportunity factors that increase the risk of financial reporting irregularities include ineffective monitoring, internal control deficiencies, and the stability and complexity of the organizational structure (AICPA 2002) . While prior research has provided evidence that effective governance mechanisms (e.g., boards of directors, audit committees, external auditors) and internal controls are deterrents of financial reporting irregularities ), a relatively unexplored opportunity risk factor is companies' organizational stability and complexity.
According to SAS No. 99, firms with an overly complex structure and high turnover of senior management or board members are likely to have greater opportunities to engage in misreporting (AICPA 2002) . Prospectors exhibit these characteristics; thus, managers of these firms may have more opportunities to misreport. For example, prospectors have a "transitory dominant coalition" (i.e., the tenure of senior management tends to be shorter), while defenders maintain a more stable senior management team Snow 1978, 2003) . Prospectors require decentralized control to facilitate and coordinate their diverse and numerous operations, while defenders require strict, centralized control in their hierarchical organizational structure. Furthermore, coordination mechanisms in prospectors are complex compared to the simple coordination mechanisms in defenders Snow 1978, 2003) . Consistent with the need to maintain flexibility within their organizational structure, Simons (1987) finds that prospectors modify their internal control systems much more frequently than defenders. Together, these differences suggest prospectors have higher risk of financial reporting irregularities than defenders because of their decentralized operations and the greater instability and complexity in their organizational structure (Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham 1989; AICPA 2002) .
In summary, we expect that prospectors are more likely than defenders to engage in financial reporting irregularities because prospectors demonstrate a greater number of incentives (e.g., rapid growth, stock-based compensation contracts, greater need to finance extensive R&D activity, tendencies toward lower profitability) and opportunities (e.g., organizational instability and complexity) to misreport. Stated formally: HYPOTHESIS 1. Prospector business strategies are more positively associated with financial reporting irregularities than defender business strategies.
Business strategy and audit effort
If organizational business strategies vary in their level of business risk and likelihood of financial reporting irregularities, we expect audit firms to exert different levels of audit effort based on their clients' business strategies. 5 Both U.S. and international auditing pronouncements (e.g., AS No. 5; ISA 315) emphasize a risk-based approach in planning the audit (AICPA 2006; IFAC 2009 ). In particular, ISA 315 emphasizes a business-risk approach considering factors such as the client's business strategy (IFAC 2009 ). In addition, leading audit firms began employing a business risk approach during the 1990s to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit (Bell, Doogar, and Solomon 2008) , and U.S. audit pronouncement AS No. 5 has also encouraged audit firms to take a "more flexible, top-down risk-based audit approach" (Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon 2010: 796) .
Despite the emphasis on client business strategy as an underlying component of client business risk in professional guidance, Hay, Knechel, and Wong's 2006 meta-analysis of audit fee models indicates that business strategy is not included as a determinant of audit fees in any study since 1980.
6 Rather, Hay et al. (2006) indicate that audit fee research employs client risk proxies such as receivable and inventory ratios to capture inherent risk (i.e., accounts more susceptible to material misstatement) and profitability and leverage measures to reflect "the extent to which the auditor may be exposed to loss in the event that a client is not financially viable" (170).
7 These and other proxies for client risk in the audit fee literature have produced mixed results (Cobbin 2002; Hay et al. 2006) . Hay et al. (2006) posit that commonly used proxies for client risk, such as profitability ratios, return on asset (ROA) ratios, and loss, indicators provide mixed results because "auditors may not be as finely calibrated to differences in the profitability metrics as the fee model suggests" (170).
In our study, we suggest that the business strategies defined by Snow (1978, 2003) represent a more comprehensive approach to addressing client business risk. Thus, consistent with auditing standards (e.g., AS No. 5; ISA 315), a business strategy approach is more likely to reflect auditors' broader views of client business risk. If auditors consider their clients' business strategy as an underlying component of client business risk, we expect that prospectors require greater audit effort because of their risk-oriented focus, tendencies toward lower profitability, and other risk characteristics (e.g., rapid growth, organizational instability, and complexity). On the other hand, we expect defenders require 5 .
We do not expect auditors to use the terms prospector or defender in describing their clients' business strategies. Doing so would require familiarity with the Miles and Snow typology. However, to the extent that auditors recognize collective firm characteristics that are consistent with the suggested characteristics noted by Miles and Snow, or the other proposed strategy classifications, audit firms will set engagement fees consistent with differences in these types of clients. 6.
In the extant literature, unobservable audit effort is represented by observable audit fees, which is supported by research linking client-related factors (e.g., size, complexity, and risk) to audit team efficiency in terms of quantity and mix of labor employed (e.g., Simunic 1980; O'Keefe, Simunic, and Stein 1994; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; Knechel, Rouse, and Schelleman 2009 ). 7.
Although Hay et al. (2006) do not classify the latter risk, Stanley (2011) provides a discussion of how a client's susceptibility to loss affects both client and auditor business risk. Furthermore, Johnstone (2000) provides empirical evidence that suggests that client business risk directly impacts the auditor's business risk assessment.
lower audit effort (lower audit fees) because they exhibit fewer risk characteristics (e.g., less risk-oriented focus, tendencies toward profitability, cautious and incremental growth patterns, organizational stability, and less complexity) relative to prospectors. Thus, when compared to defenders, prospectors' unique client business risks likely result in auditors exerting greater audit effort for prospectors in order to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level. Stated formally:
HYPOTHESIS 2. Prospector business strategies are more positively associated with the level of audit effort than defender business strategies.
Measures and models
Business strategy composite measure
Relying on Snow (1978, 2003) , we construct a discrete STRATEGY composite measure, which proxies for the organization's business strategy. Higher STRATEGY scores represent companies with prospector strategies and lower scores represent companies with defender strategies. Similar to Ittner et al. 1997 , we use the following characteristics for the STRATEGY composite measure: (a) the ratio of research and development to sales, (b) the ratio of employees to sales, and (c) a historical growth measure (one-year percentage change in total sales). 8 Ittner et al. (1997) used a fourth measure, the number of new product or service introductions, which requires access to a proprietary database. As a substitute for this measure using publicly available data, we use (4) the ratio of marketing (SG&A) to sales, which Hambrick (1983) found empirically differentiates prospectors from defenders. Snow's (1978, 2003) theory suggests that other important attributes that distinguish prospectors and defenders include organizational stability regarding the length of employee tenure and the efficiency and automation of operations as reflected in overall capital intensity. 9 We capture these two attributes using (5) a measure of employee fluctuations (standard deviation of total employees) and (6) a measure of capital intensity (net PPE scaled by total assets), respectively. Consistent with Ittner et al. 1997 , all variables are computed using a rolling average over the prior five years. Each of the six individual variables is ranked by forming quintiles within each two-digit SIC industry-year. Within each company-year, those observations with variables in the highest quintile are given a score of 5, in the second-highest quintile are given a score of 4, and so on, and those observations with variables in the lowest quintile are given a score of 1. Then for each company-year, we sum the scores across the six variables such that a company could receive a maximum score of 30 (prospector-type) and a minimum score of 6 (defender-type). Refer to Appendix 2 for details related to our business strategy composite measure construction and Appendix 3 for examples of companies in each strategy. 10 8. Ittner et al. (1997) use market-to-book ratio to proxy for growth. We use the 1-year percentage change in sales for the growth component of our strategy measure and include book-to-market as a control variable in our models of financial reporting irregularities. In sensitivity tests, we replace our growth proxy with market-to-book following Ittner et al. 1997 and our results are robust in our audit fee model and two of our irregularity samples (AAERs and lawsuits). 9. Hambrick (1983) provides empirical evidence that relative to prospectors, defenders are more automated and efficient (i.e., defenders have higher ratios of gross assets to employees, higher value added to employees, and lower direct costs) and concludes that defenders are more capital intensive while prospectors have "more flexible, labor intensive capacity configurations" (23). 10.
We also use factor scores as an alternative to our composite measure of business strategy and obtain similar results. We discuss the results of this additional test in greater detail in section 7.
Financial reporting irregularities
We use logistic regression to determine whether business strategy is associated with our three financial reporting irregularities: AAERs, lawsuits due to accounting improprieties, and accounting restatements. Our model for the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities is as follows with subscripts omitted:
For each irregularity model, we define the dependent variable based on the periods during which misreporting occurred. Thus, FR_IRREGULARITY takes a value of 1 for periods misreported according to the AAER, lawsuit, or restatement, and zero otherwise, in each of the respective models.
11 The remaining variables are defined in Table 1 . Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient on STRATEGY.
For the remaining coefficients we discuss them in the context of SAS No. 99, and indicate whether the variables represent the incentive or opportunity to engage in financial reporting irregularities. We include the following variables to proxy for incentives: firm size (ln (ASSETS))
12
; profitability (ROA; LOSS); growth (BTM; SALES GROWTH); merger and acquisition activity (M&A); leverage (LEVERAGE); financing needs (FINANC-ING); and firm age (FIRM AGE). We do not predict a sign for the coefficients on ln (ASSETS) or LEVERAGE based on the mixed results in prior research (e.g., Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 1999; Turner and Weirich 2006; McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 2012) . Based on prior research (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Beneish 1997 Beneish , 1999 Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beasley et al. 1999; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011; McGuire et al. 2012 ), we expect a negative coefficient on ROA and a positive coefficient on LOSS; we expect a negative coefficient for BTM and do not predict direction for the coefficient on SALES GROWTH; we expect a positive coefficient on M&A and a positive coefficient on FINANCING; we expect a negative coefficient on FIRM AGE. We control for industry competition using a Herfindahl Index (HERF) and expect a positive coefficient because higher values of HERF indicate greater industry competition, which is an incentive risk factor from the SAS No. 99 framework (AICPA 2002) .
The factors that represent significant opportunity risk are industry conditions, accounts based on significant estimates or unusual transactions, and ineffective monitoring (AICPA 2002). We follow prior research (e.g., Beneish 1999; Farber 2005; Dechow et al. 2011 ) to determine our variables. We include an indicator variable for litigious industries (LITIGIOUS) and expect a positive coefficient because these industries have a greater likelihood of lawsuits (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994) . We include discretionary accruals (DAP) because prior research suggests high or unusual accruals indicate high-risk audits (e.g., Beneish 1997 Beneish , 1999 Dechow et al. 2011 ). However, Schelleman and Knechel (2010) argue that auditors are presumably aware of their clients' accounting choices and thus the level of accruals may not indicate high risk. Therefore, we 11.
Although our main model tests each type of irregularity separately, in later sensitivity analyses we combine the irregularities to form a single irregularity indicator and examine the impact of business strategy in the combined sample. 12.
Our results are consistent if we control for size using the natural log of market value of equity. = Ratio of the number of employees to sales computed over a rolling prior five-year average.
REV5
= One-year percentage change in total sales computed over a rolling prior five-year average. SGA5 = Ratio of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses to sales computed over a rolling prior five-year average. r(EMP5) = Standard deviation of the total number of employees computed over a rolling prior five-year period. CAP5 = Capital intensity measured as net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets and computed over a rolling prior five-year average. AAER = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experiences an AAER (obtained from Audit Integrity, a proprietary source) anytime during the year and 0 otherwise. LAWSUIT = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experiences a lawsuit due to an accounting irregularity (obtained from Audit Analytics) anytime during the year and 0 otherwise. RESTATE = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experiences a restatement during the year and 0 otherwise.
ln(ASSETS)
= Natural logarithm of total assets. ROA = Return on assets equal to income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. LOSS = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a loss occurred within the current or previous two fiscal years (income before extraordinary items is negative) and 0 otherwise. BTM = Book-to-market ratio equal to total common equity outstanding divided by the market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. SALES GROWTH = Percentage change in sales from the prior year to the current year. M&A = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a merger or acquisition occurred in prior five years and 0 otherwise from COMPUSTAT footnote codes. LEVERAGE = Financial leverage equal to total debt divided by total assets. FINANCING = Ex ante measure of firm's desire for financing (based on Dechow et al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2006) where an indicator variable is equal to 1 if the firm's free cash is less than À0.5 and 0 otherwise. Where FreeCash = {[Cash from operations t -Avg Capital Expenditures t-3 to t-1 ] / Current Assets t-1 }. FIRM AGE = Length of time in years the firm has been publicly listed based on the company's initial public offering (IPO) date from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). HERF = Herfindahl Index (based on Cheng 2005) equal to the sum of squares of market shares of all companies in an industry (three-digit SIC) where market share equals the company with sales in time t divided by sum of (sales)t over the three-digit SIC industry, where the higher the Herfindahl Index, the more concentrated the industry.
(The table is continued on the next page.) offer no prediction for the coefficient on DAP. 13 We include an indicator for Big N audit firms (BIGN) and use dedicated institutional ownership (DED IO) to represent external monitoring (e.g., Farber 2005; McGuire et al. 2012 ). We expect a negative coefficient for BIGN. However, Farber (2005) finds no difference in the level of institutional investors for samples of fraud and non-fraud firms; thus, we make no prediction for the coefficient on DED IO.
14 To control for potential firm, industry, and time fixed effects in our panel data, we include year and industry indicators and cluster by firm (Petersen 2009 = Natural logarithm of total nonaudit fees from Audit Analytics.
13.
In untabulated robustness tests, we replace discretionary accruals with Dechow and Dichev's 2002 accruals quality measure because Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez (2008) and Price, Sharp, and Wood (2011) find the Dechow and Dichev 2002 measure is more strongly associated with financial reporting irregularities. We note that while accruals quality is positive and significant in our AAER and lawsuit models, the coefficient on STRATEGY remains positive and significant in all three models. 14.
We rely on dedicated institutional investors as a monitoring variable rather than other measures of governance such as board of director or audit committee characteristics because of concerns about a potentially endogenous relation between these alternative governance characteristics and our STRATEGY variable.
Audit fee model
We construct an audit fee model based on standard measures from the audit fee literature and rely on Hay et al.'s 2006 framework to classify our audit fee model controls according to each major audit fee determinant (refer to Table 2 in Hay et al. 2006) . Our model is as follows, with subscripts omitted:
We provide variable definitions in Table 1 . We discuss our expectations for the model coefficients below, based on Snow (1978, 2003) and the prior audit fee literature. Based on Hypothesis 2, we expect the coefficient for STRATEGY to be positive if auditors exert greater effort for prospectors and lower effort for defenders. The primary client attributes that explain audit fees are client size, complexity, and risk (Hay et al. 2006 ). Client size is measured using the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(ASSETS)), and based on prior research, we expect a positive coefficient on ln(ASSETS). We proxy for client complexity using the number of business segments (sqrt(BUS SEG)) and the percentage of foreign-based sales (FOREIGN).
15 Similar to prior research, we expect positive coefficients for our measures of client complexity (Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; Hay et al. 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2009) .
Based on Hay et al. (2006), we also include in the model proxies associated with risks relevant to an audit engagement: factors that increase inherent risk and factors that increase auditor business risk. Inherent risk factors relate to the difficulty and greater risk of error in auditing certain accounts (e.g., receivables or inventories), while auditor business risk factors relate to the risk of managing an audit firm and the auditor's exposure to potential loss (Hay et al. 2006; Stanley 2011) . We argue that business strategy likely represents the risks associated with specific client strategy choices; thus, we include these additional risk proxies to separate the effects of risk related to engaging in audit practice from client business risk. This separation is consistent with Stanley 2011 who separately identifies the risks that are specific to offering services as an auditor versus the risks specific to the client business operation. We proxy for inherent risk using the proportion of receivables and inventories in total assets (RECINV), and we expect a positive coefficient on RECINV. We proxy for auditor business risk using return on assets (ROA) and a loss indicator (LOSS), and we expect a negative coefficient on ROA and a positive coefficient on LOSS (Hay et al. 2006 ). To capture additional proxies related to auditor business risk, we use two common leverage ratios, the ratio of total debt to assets (LEVERAGE) and the quick ratio (QUICK) (Hay et al. 2006) . Hay et al. (2006) also suggest internal control weaknesses, governance or monitoring mechanisms, and industry characteristics as client risk factors that should be included in an audit fee model. The effectiveness of internal controls is represented in our model by material weakness occurrences (MW), and we expect a positive coefficient on MW
15.
We follow Francis et al. 2005 in using business segments and percentage of foreign-based sales for complexity. Potential alternative measures of complexity include the number of subsidiaries or the proportion of foreign subsidiaries; however, the number of subsidiaries is not readily available for U.S. firms. Thus, we rely on the number of business segments as our proxy for complexity. In robustness tests, we replace the percentage of foreign-based sales with percentage of foreign-based assets, and our audit fee results are robust. (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008) . To control for external monitoring, we use dedicated institutional investors (DED IO) (Bushee and Noe 2000; Bushee 2001 ). Based on Hay et al. (2006), we expect a positive coefficient on DED IO. We include industry fixed effects in the model to control for industry characteristics. Hay et al. (2006) indicate that auditor attributes such as auditor quality and auditor tenure affect audit fees. Both Big N audit firms (BIGN) and industry specialists (SPE-CIALIST) are typically associated with higher audit quality; thus, we expect positive coefficients for BIGN and SPECIALIST (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Palmrose 1988; Francis et al. 2005; Hay et al. 2006; Reichelt and Wang 2010) . Although prior research suggests an association between auditor tenure (AUD TENURE) and audit fees (Casterella et al. 2004; Hay et al. 2006; Hribar et al. 2009 ), Hay et al.'s 2006 meta-analysis indicates mixed results; therefore, we do not predict a sign for the coefficient on AUD TENURE.
Engagement attributes such as busy season, audit problems, and nonaudit services also affect audit fees (Hay et al. 2006) . We measure busy season using a calendar year-end reporting indicator variable (YE), and we expect a positive coefficient based on Hay et al.'s 2006 meta-analysis. Additionally, we expect a positive coefficient on both modified audit opinions (AUD OPINION) and non-audit services (ln(NON AUDIT)). Finally, to AAER-years (1993 AAER-years ( -2006 11,679
Merge Lawsuit-COMPUSTAT data set (2,716 company-years or 1,205 unique lawsuits) with STRATEGY-irregularity control variable data set for 344 lawsuit-years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 
15,449
Merge Restatement-COMPUSTAT data set (9,172 company-years or 4,625 unique irregular restatements) with STRATEGY-irregularity control variable data set for 1,763 restatement-years (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) control for potential firm and time fixed effects in our panel data we include year indicators and cluster by firm (Petersen 2009 ). Table 2 outlines our sample selection process. We construct our business STRATEGY measure using all firms from the COMPUSTAT Annual file for fiscal years between 1980 and 2009 with positive sales and asset observations, and non-missing historical SIC codes. 17 We then delete utilities and financial industries (SIC 4900-99 and 6000-999) due to the regulated nature of these industries. All data used to construct the STRATEGY measure requires a five-year rolling average (e.g., Ittner et al. 1997) .
16

Data
18 After imposing the five-year rolling average constraint and deleting missing data, we have a sample of 57,517 company-year observations from 1993 to 2009 for the STRATEGY measure.
We construct our financial reporting irregularities samples from three data sources: (a) a sample of SEC AAERs, obtained from Audit Integrity; (b) shareholder lawsuits related to accounting improprieties, obtained from the Audit Analytics litigation database; and (c) accounting restatements, obtained from the Audit Analytics restatements database. Our AAER sample contains 11,679 company-year observations with 206 AAER-year observations between fiscal years 1993 to 2006; our lawsuit sample contains 15,449 company-year observations with 344 lawsuit-year observations between fiscal years 1995 to 2009; and our restatement sample contains 14,409 company-year observations with 1,763 restatement-year observations between fiscal years 1998 to 2009. Because some of the irregularities overlap, our combined sample includes 2,083 company years associated with financial reporting irregularities, which we examine in a combined irregularity sample in later robustness tests.
Our audit fee sample is based on fiscal years 2001 to 2009, using audit fee data from Audit Analytics and all available COMPUSTAT data for the control variables in the audit fee model. Our audit fee sample contains 11,837 company-year observations.
The descriptive statistics for our samples are presented in Table 3 ; we also present separate descriptive statistics for companies following prospector and defender strategies. Table 3 , panel A presents the industry affiliations for our sample, where 57,517 total company-year observations represent 4,112 prospector-years and 3,473 defender-years, and the remaining observations representing our analyzer category.
19 Consistent with expectations,
16.
Although we are consistent with the audit fee literature in measuring both our control variables and our dependent variable (ln(AUDIT FEES)) in time t, to the extent that audit fees are determined at the beginning of the client's fiscal year, our dependent variable (ln(AUDIT FEES)) could potentially be determined before our independent variables. However, this timing concern is less problematic for our variable of interest, STRATEGY, because this variable is computed using a rolling prior 5-year average. To address this potential timing concern, in robustness tests we take a lead value (t + 1) of our dependent variable, ln(AUDIT FEES), and reestimate our audit fee model using time t for our explanatory variables. This method ensures that our dependent variable is determined after the explanatory variables. Our results remain robust to this specification. 17.
Based on prior research by Jan and Ou 2008, we do not exclude negative book-to-market companies. Because companies with significant R&D expenditures may represent negative book value companies and R&D expenditures are an input into our STRATEGY measure, we would omit a large number of potential prospector companies and impose a selection bias on the sample if we deleted negative book value companies. However, if we delete negative book-to-market firms, our inferences are unchanged. 18.
We require at least three years of non-missing observations for each of our measures to preserve observations, provided that the company has at least six years of consecutive data in COMPUSTAT. When we either tighten or ease this restriction, our inferences remain unchanged.
19.
Because some firm-year observations in our sample have STRATEGY scores just below (above) the cutoff point for prospectors (defenders), our sample of analyzers is also likely to include some firms that are "less obvious" prospectors or defenders. For simplicity, we refer to all of the firms between our two cutoff points as analyzers. all three viable business strategies (prospectors, defenders, and analyzers) are common in each industry Snow 1978, 2003) . We find that the percentages of prospectors and defenders in each industry are similar to each other and to the percentage of the total sample in each industry. For example, the largest industry segment represented in our sample is the manufacturing sector (two-digit SIC codes 20-39), which consists of approxi- Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. mately 56 percent of the total firms. Similarly, the manufacturing sector remains the largest industry segment represented within each of the prospector and defender firm subsamples, consisting of approximately 62 percent of firms in each subsample. Table 3 , panel B provides descriptive statistics for our STRATEGY composite measure and the raw components of STRATEGY, while panels C and D provide descriptive statistics for variables in our financial reporting irregularity and audit fee models, respectively. Consistent with expectations, prospectors and defenders have significantly different means and medians (p < 0.05) for each of the six STRATEGY components-i.e., R&D/ sales (RDS5), employees/sales (EMPS5), percentage change in total revenue (REV5), SG&A/sales (SGA5), standard deviation of total number of employees [r(EMP5)], and capital intensity (CAP5).
In the financial reporting irregularity samples (Table 3 , panel C), prospectors have significantly higher occurrences of AAERs, lawsuits, and restatements compared to defenders, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Prospectors and defenders show significant differences in mean and median values (p < 0.05) across all control variables except for BIGN and DED IO. Compared to defenders, prospectors are smaller (ln(ASSETS)), less profitable (ROA; LOSS), more growth-oriented (BTM; SALES GROWTH), engage in more mergers and acquisitions (M&A), have lower leverage (LEVERAGE), and have a greater need for financing (FINANCING) . Prospectors are also younger (FIRM AGE), involved in less concentrated markets (HERF), operate in more litigious industries (LITIGIOUS), and have lower discretionary accruals (DAP).
In the audit fee sample (Table 3 , panel D), prospectors have higher audit fees (ln (AUDIT FEE)), consistent with Hypothesis 2. There are no significant differences at the mean or median (p > 0.05) between prospectors and defenders for the following variables: ln(ASSETS), DED IO, BIGN, SPECIALIST, AUD TENURE, YE, and AUD OPIN.
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There are significant differences between prospectors and defenders on business segments (sqrt(BUS SEG) and foreign sales (FOREIGN); however, prospectors have higher foreign sales but fewer business segments, which partially supports the Snow (1978, 2003) expectation that prospectors have a more diverse and complex organization. Prospectors also have lower inventory quantities than defenders (RECINV) and correspondingly have greater short-term liquidity (QUICK). Consistent with prior research Snow 1978, 2003; Hambrick 1983; Ittner et al. 1997) , prospectors have lower profitability (ROA) and greater loss (LOSS) occurrences than defenders. Finally, prospectors have lower leverage (LEVERAGE), experience more material weaknesses (MW), and pay higher nonaudit fees (ln(NON AUDIT)) than defenders.
In untabulated results, we consider the correlations among STRATEGY and the variables used in our financial reporting irregularities and audit fee models. Our STRATEGY measure is positively correlated (p < 0.01) with all three types of financial reporting irregularities (AAERs, lawsuits, and restatements), and the level of audit fees. Among the model variables, the correlations are consistent with prior literature, and only seven exhibit correlations greater than 0.50 including the correlations between audit and nonaudit fees, size and audit fees, and size and the use of a Big N auditor. Table 4 , panel A presents results from estimating our financial reporting irregularities models. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, STRATEGY is positive and significant in the 20.
Results
Financial reporting irregularities
All the continuous measures in the audit fee model are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In the financial reporting irregularity models, we winsorize only book-to-market and discretionary accruals. However, our results in the irregularities models are robust to winsorizing all continuous variables. AAER (p < 0.05), lawsuit (p < 0.05), and restatement (p < 0.01) models, respectively. The positive coefficient estimate for STRATEGY indicates that prospectors are more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities than defenders. Results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the odds of experiencing an AAER, lawsuit, or restatement are restatement are 2.32, 1.10, and 0.47 times higher, respectively, for firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for prospectors relative to firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for defenders. We note that although these irregularities are low-probability events, they are highcost occurrences for the firms. The control variables across the samples are generally consistent with expectations from prior research. Overall, the model has a good fit with a ROC curve value of 0.73 or greater for all models. Untabulated results suggest that STRATEGY significantly contributes to all three of the models' explanatory power using a likelihood ratio chi-squared test (p < 0.01) and using model fit statistics based on Raftery (1995). Table 4 , panel B presents the results for our audit fee model. The positive and significant coefficient for STRATEGY (p < 0.01) suggests that prospectors are associated with a higher level of audit effort than defenders, consistent with Hypothesis 2. We note that the positive and significant coefficient on STRATEGY suggests that STRATEGY captures elements of client business risk that go beyond the risks captured by commonly used proxies for size, complexity, and risk (and other audit fee model controls). All the control variable coefficients are significant and have the expected sign and significance except for SPE-CIALIST and AUD TENURE, which are insignificant. 21 The sign on the coefficient for LEVERAGE is opposite our expectation. An economic interpretation of the coefficient estimate for STRATEGY indicates that, ceteris paribus, firms at the cutoff for prospectors will pay audit fees approximately 22 percent higher than firms at the cutoff for defenders. The average audit fees in our sample are $1.62 million, suggesting the difference in audit fees paid by otherwise equal firms at the cutoff points for prospectors and defenders is approximately $356,400. Therefore, these results suggest that auditors exert more audit effort for companies on the prospector end of the strategy continuum. 22 As an alternative method of quantifying the effect of STRATEGY, we compare predicted audit fees for prospector clients with and without STRATEGY in the fee model. We find that predicted audit fees for prospector clients are, on average, $149,000 higher relative to all firms in our sample. Thus, our results suggest business strategy is an economically important determinant of audit effort.
Audit fee model
Additional analyses
Reconciling the financial reporting irregularity and audit fee results Our results suggest that even though auditors appear to exert greater audit effort for firms employing the prospector strategy, prospectors experience more financial reporting irregularities than defenders. One potential explanation for this apparent paradox is the time period we examine. We examine financial reporting irregularities beginning in 1993; however, our analysis of audit fees is restricted to periods after 2000. Thus, one explanation might be a differential frequency of financial reporting irregularities for prospectors in the 21.
To further investigate potential audit quality differences among prospector and defender clients, we also examine whether industry specialist serves as a moderator on the effect of STRATEGY on audit fees by including an interaction term between STRATEGY and SPECIALIST; the coefficient on the interaction is not significant.
22.
Untabulated results suggest that STRATEGY significantly contributes to the model's explanatory power (F-statistic 58.26, p < 0.001).
post-2000 period versus the 1990s and the sensitivity of audit fees to those financial reporting irregularities. Prior research demonstrates an increased sensitivity of audit fees to financial reporting risk during 2000 . Specifically, Charles, Glover, and Sharp (2010 find that for the period 2000-2003 there was a significant increase in the association between audit fees and financial reporting risk, which they attribute to events that impacted the auditing profession during that period (e.g., recommendations from the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, Enron, Worldcom, etc., Sarbanes-Oxley, and SAS No. 99). Thus, to explore the possibility that the sensitivity of audit fees to risk may differ before and after 2000, we align our financial reporting irregularities data with our audit fee data by restricting financial reporting irregularities to post-2000. We find that our STRATEGY measure remains positive and significant in all our irregularity models in the post-2000 sample. In addition, even after adding controls for material weakness occurrences and fees for nonaudit services in the financial reporting irregularity models, which restricts the sample to the post-2001 period, STRATEGY remains positive and significant in all irregularity models.
We consider another potential explanation for our finding that prospector firms appear to receive greater audit effort (as observed with higher audit fees) but experience higher incidences of financial reporting irregularities. Prior research has argued that the expected positive relationship between client business risk and audit fees could arise from the implementation of more costly audit procedures to reduce audit risk (i.e., greater audit effort) or from an assessed audit fee premium to cover the increase in auditor's business risk (e.g., due to potential litigation). We try to disentangle these two explanations.
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If auditors are only assessing an audit fee premium to cover the increase in auditor business risk and are not implementing the more costly audit procedures necessary to cover the additional risks of prospector clients, then prospectors could persist in experiencing irregularities despite the increase in audit fees. Thus, we consider whether the positive relation between STRATEGY and financial reporting irregularities is moderated by lower audit quality.
We create three additional indicator variables for low audit quality and interact each with STRATEGY in the financial irregularity model. The three indicator variables relate to different attributes of lower audit quality: low audit effort, low experience with the audit client, and low auditor industry expertise. 24 We measure low audit effort by constructing an indicator variable equal to one if abnormal audit fees are negative (i.e., where expected fees exceed actual fees), following Choi, Kim, and Zang 2009 in the construction of the abnormal fee measure. We measure low experience with the audit client by constructing an indicator variable equal to one if audit firm tenure is below our sample mean. 25 We measure low auditor industry expertise as an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is not an industry specialist. Untabulated results reveal that although STRATEGY remains positive and significant, none of the interactions is significant, suggesting that the association between STRATEGY and financial reporting irregularities is not moderated by lower audit quality.
We also consider whether auditors adjust their audit procedures for prospector clients with irregularities relative to those without irregularities to determine if auditors do recognize the additional risks of clients that experience irregularities. To examine this issue, we construct a measure of abnormal audit fees where abnormal audit fees are defined as the 23.
Refer to Stanley 2011 for a more in-depth discussion of these competing explanations. 24.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 25.
We recognize that there is strong debate concerning whether audit tenure improves audit quality; however, we take the position consistent with Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003 that greater tenure improves audit quality.
difference between expected and actual audit fees (Choi et al. 2009 ). For our measure of expected fees we use the predicted values from our audit fee model that includes the STRATEGY measure. 26 We find that prospectors' abnormal audit fees are negative overall, suggesting that the assessed audit fees are too low on average. Furthermore, we find that prospectors with and without irregularities do not incur statistically different abnormal audit fees. Thus, although auditors assess greater audit fees for prospector clients, the audit fees do not appear sufficient to compensate for the additional risk of prospector clients, including those with irregularities. Altogether, these findings suggest that audit fees may be too constrained for prospector clients, especially those prospectors at a greater risk of experiencing irregularities.
Alternate measures of financial reporting irregularities
Instead of considering each financial reporting irregularity sample separately, Table 5 presents results from combining our financial reporting irregularities such that our dependent variable equals one if the firm experiences an AAER, lawsuit, and/or restatement and zero otherwise. Again consistent with Hypothesis 1, STRATEGY is positive and significant in this model (p < 0.01). Results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the odds of experiencing any irregularity are 0.62 times higher for firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for prospectors relative to firms with a STRATEGY score at the cutoff for defenders.
As additional untabulated sensitivity tests, we first expand our investigation of irregularities to include a broader set of accounting-related SEC enforcement actions from the Martin (2008a, 2008b) studies. We find that STRATEGY is positively associated with these SEC enforcement actions (p < 0.05). We also investigate the association between STRATEGY and two commercial fraud risk measures (Accounting and Governance Risk and Accounting Risk) developed by Audit Integrity (see Price et al. 2011) . We find that STRATEGY is positively related to both commercial risk measures (p < 0.01).
Alternate business strategy indicators
Our results are also robust in all the irregularity samples when we replace our discrete STRATEGY measure with indicator variables for prospectors and defenders. The Prospector indicator variable is positive and significant in the AAER, lawsuit, and restatement models. The coefficient for the Defender indicator is generally not significant in the irregularity models (except in the restatement model where the coefficient is negative and significant) suggesting that defenders are generally not significantly different from analyzers with respect to the likelihood of experiencing irregularities.
Material weaknesses and nonaudit fees
We also include a control for material weakness occurrences in our irregularity models because material weaknesses have been linked to lower-quality accounting (e.g., McVay 2007a, 2007b) . In addition, we control for nonaudit fees because anecdotal evidence and corresponding legislation (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) suggest that nonaudit services may impair audit quality.
27 While imposing these controls restricts 26. For ease in interpreting the abnormal audit fee measure, we follow Choi et al. 2009 and "compute the dollar value of abnormal fees as the differences between the actual dollar values of audit fees and normal dollar values of audit fees after converting the estimated logged normal fees into their respective dollar values (by using the exponential function to convert logged values to actual values)" (10). We then scale the dollar value of abnormal fees by actual audit fees to obtain a percentage measure of abnormal fees. 27.
We note that academic research has been mixed on this topic, and Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) and Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood (2012) do not find evidence to support the assertion that nonaudit services impair audit quality.
our sample to fiscal year 2002 and onward, we note that although the coefficient on material weakness occurrences is positive and significant and the coefficient on nonaudit fees is insignificant, the STRATEGY coefficient is positive and significant across all types of irregularities.
Client business risk versus financial reporting risk
Given that our results suggest STRATEGY is associated with more frequent occurrences of financial reporting irregularities, it is possible that STRATEGY proxies for companies' client business risk or financial reporting risk. To examine this issue, we conduct two tests. First, we estimate the predicted probabilities of each financial reporting irregularity without our STRATEGY measure in the models. 28 We then add those predicted probabilities individually in our audit fee model along with STRATEGY. This provides a more direct test of STRATEGY against financial reporting risk factors that are known to increase audit fees and allows us to determine whether STRATEGY captures client business risk or whether STRATEGY is just a substitute for financial reporting risk. In untabulated results, we find that the coefficient for STRATEGY continues to be positive and significant in the audit fee model when including the predicted probabilities of financial reporting irregularities as additional controls. Second, we regress STRATEGY on the likelihood of the three financial reporting irregularities and use the residual from that estimation in our audit fee model in place of STRATEGY. This method should orthogonalize our STRAT-EGY measure from the likelihood of a financial reporting irregularity. We find the coefficient on the residual from this estimation is positive and significant in the audit fee model, suggesting STRATEGY is not merely a substitute for financial reporting risk. Based on these two tests, we suggest that our STRATEGY variable primarily represents client business risk.
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Firm size
Although our descriptive statistics for the audit fee model indicate no significant differences between prospectors and defenders in either mean or median values of firm size (ln (ASSETS)), we examine whether firm size is a determinant of strategy and hence an alternative explanation for our results. 30 We use an approach based on Carson and Fargher 2007 and form size quintiles based on ln(ASSETS) and interact STRATEGY with three of the size quintiles representing the smallest, median, and largest companies in the sample. We then include the following interaction terms in the audit fee model along with the STRATEGY main effect: STRATEGY*SizeQ1, STRATEGY*SizeQ3, STRATEGY*SizeQ5 (i.e., the interaction terms of STRATEGY with size quintiles 1, 3, and 5, respectively). Our results indicate that the coefficient on STRATEGY remains positive and significant in the model (p < 0.01) while the coefficients on the interactions are as follows: STRAT-EGY*SizeQ1 is negative and significant, STRATEGY*SizeQ3 is insignificant, and STRAT-
28.
Given the ROC values on estimates of the irregularity models without STRATEGY, we believe these are reasonable in-sample estimates of the likelihoods of each of these outcomes. 29.
We note that our audit fee model results are robust to controlling for bankruptcy risk using Altman's Zscore (Altman 1968) , which suggests that STRATEGY does not substitute for bankruptcy risk. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on Altman's Z-score is negative and significant (p < 0.01) and the STRATEGY coefficient remains positive and significant (p < 0.01) in our fee model.
30.
The insignificant differences in size between defenders and prospectors in our audit fee sample are consistent with prior research. Smith, Guthrie, and Chen (1989) find that there are few differences in the size distributions of defenders and prospectors. Further, in a factor analysis, we find that firm size does not load on a factor with our business strategy components.
EGY*SizeQ5 is positive and significant. The results suggest that size is related but is not a primary determinant of the STRATEGY results reported in Table 4 . 31 Finally, we use seemingly unrelated estimation (SUEST) to test whether the STRATEGY coefficients across the size quintiles are equal and find that the coefficients across size quintiles are not statistically different (chi-square 5.60, p = 0.23). Therefore, based on these additional tests, we conclude that our results in Table 4 , panel B, are not driven by effects related to firm size.
Business strategy component analysis
To assess whether STRATEGY represents a construct separate from the measures of complexity and risk included in traditional audit fee models, we perform several additional tests. First, we perform canonical correlation and redundancy index analyses (Stewart and Love 1968) on the raw STRATEGY components and the control variables from the audit fee model. We find evidence that the components of STRATEGY and the audit fee control variables comprise two separate constructs with very little overlapping variance between them. The combination of the first two squared canonical correlations explains 93 percent of the covariance between the two variable sets (i.e., STRATEGY components and the audit fee control components); however, an average of only 7 percent of each variable set's variance is included in these correlations (i.e., 8.8 percent of the variance in the STRAT-EGY components are explained by the audit control variables while only 5.5 percent of the variance in the audit fee controls are explained by the STRATEGY components). Next, we deconstruct the STRATEGY measure into its individual components and replace STRATEGY with its individual components in the audit fee and financial reporting irregularity models. We find that the coefficients on many of the individual components are not significant or are significant but the components' signs are not always consistent with the sign of the composite STRATEGY measure. 32 In addition, when we perform factor analysis on all six raw components of STRATEGY, all items load on one factor. To be consistent with organizational theory which evaluates these components relative to industry competitors, we create factor scores by industry-year. In untabulated tests, we replace our discrete STRATEGY measure in our regression models with factor scores created from the six STRATEGY components and our inferences remain unchanged. This provides confirming evidence that when we use loadings based on factor analysis, the construct we capture with our STRATEGY measure is confirmed. Collectively, our component analyses suggest that our STRATEGY measure captures a construct that is "greater than the sum of its parts".
Finally, we perform a factor analysis on our STRATEGY composite score with our audit fee control variables and find that the audit fee controls load primarily on the first two factors while STRATEGY loads weakly on the third factor (factor loading < 0.40), separate from all audit fee controls except for FOREIGN, RECINV, and QUICK. 33 Thus, STRATEGY appears to capture a construct separate from individual measures of client size, complexity, and risk and is not a substitute for these measures.
Company strategy consistency
Organizational theory Snow 1978, 2003) posits that when companies adopt a particular business strategy, the strategy should remain consistent over time. Thus, we expect prospectors, defenders, and analyzers to have relatively stable STRATEGY scores from year to year. For example, we expect companies classified as prospectors to demonstrate high STRATEGY scores and companies classified as defenders to exhibit low STRATEGY scores consistently during our sample period. To examine the consistency of our STRATEGY scores, we first analyze the variance of our STRATEGY measure within companies, which requires that companies have at least two consecutive years to compute variance.
Untabulated results indicate that about 5 percent of companies have STRATEGY scores that never change. The mean (median) variance is 2.87 (1.75). We run first differences for each company-year STRATEGY score to determine how many total times companies with consecutive year observations changed their scores. About 34 percent of companies did not change scores from year to year, while about 42 percent of companies changed their scores by only one value (e.g., changing from 30 to 29). Less than 3 percent of companies changed their STRATEGY score by more than three values. Untabulated
32.
For example, in the audit fee model, employee fluctuations are positive and significant (r(EMP5)), while capital intensity (CAP5) is negative and significant; none of the other variables is significant. In the AAER model, the coefficients on both SG&A ratio (SGA5) and capital intensity (CAP5) are negative and significant; none of the variables is positively related to AAERs. Similar results are found for the other two irregularity models. 33.
Controls related to client size and auditor quality load on a separate factor from STRATEGY (e.g., ln (ASSETS), sqrt(BUS SEG), DED IO, BIGN, SPECIALIST, AUD TENURE, AUD OPINION, and ln (NON AUDIT)). The other remaining audit fee controls also load on the second factor separate from STRATEGY. correlation tests reveal that STRATEGY is positive and significantly correlated with its one-year lag value and has a correlation coefficient above 0.90 (p < 0.001) for both Pearson and Spearman correlations. Altogether, consistent with expectations from theory, these results suggest that our STRATEGY measure is stable over time within firms.
Investment opportunity sets
In a final additional analysis, we control for investment opportunity sets (IOS) because prior research has found that audit clients with higher IOS are more likely to have higherquality industry-specialist auditors and pay higher audit fees (Cahan, Godfrey, Hamilton, and Jeter 2008) . Investment opportunity sets, as operationalized by Cahan et al. 2008 and based on the IOS measure developed by Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang 1996, capture both industry-level and firm-level IOS; thus, it is likely that STRATEGY, if it is a substitute, substitutes for firm-level IOS. We estimate the IOS for our sample firms and include the measure in our audit fee and financial reporting irregularity models. We note that both prospector and defender strategies exist at various levels of our IOS measure, including industries where the IOS is the highest. As shown in Table 6 , panels A and B, the coefficient on STRATEGY remains positive and significant after controlling for IOS in our irregularity and audit fee models. Thus, our results suggest that STRATEGY is not a proxy for investment opportunities.
Conclusion
Using Snow's (1978, 2003) strategy typology, we provide a measure of business strategy that requires only publicly available information and is generalizable across industries. Using this measure, we first investigate whether companies' business strategies exhibit differences in the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities. We find that companies fol- lowing a prospector strategy are more likely than companies following a defender strategy to experience financial reporting irregularities across three samples of irregularities: SEC AAERs, shareholder lawsuits related to alleged accounting improprieties, and accounting restatements. Based on additional analysis, we provide evidence that the business strategy measure represents client business risk and is not a substitute for financial reporting risk. Next, we explore whether clients' business strategies represent an underlying determinant of audit effort levels because of differences in the client business risk of the strategies. We find that clients following a prospector strategy have higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors expend greater audit effort for these clients compared to defenders. Even after controlling for standard measures of client size, risk, and complexity, we find that our business strategy measure is significant in an audit fee model. In additional analyses we provide evidence that business strategy provides incremental explanatory power over measures suggested by prior literature as determinants of audit fees.
We consider several alternative explanations for why prospectors experience irregularities despite the apparent increase in auditor effort and conclude that lower audit quality does not explain our results. Instead, our findings suggest despite the higher audit fees (and higher audit effort) for prospectors, fees are not high enough to account for the riskiness of these clients. Alternatively, there may be nothing auditors can do to further reduce this risk with current audit technology. Future research should explore how to improve audits of prospector clients.
Finally, we deconstruct the business strategy measure into its individual components in our audit fee and financial reporting irregularities models and find that the individual measures either do not load significantly or load with opposite signs. In addition, we replace our STRATEGY measure with factor loadings and obtain similar results. Thus, it appears that using organizational strategy typology to combine these measures captures a unique construct that is "greater than the sum of its parts".
Our research is subject to several limitations. Although we rely on Snow's (1978, 2003) strategy typology to create our STRATEGY measure, we assess business strategy with noise. To the extent that measurement error could lead to misclassifying some firms' business strategies, this is a limitation of our study. Another limitation is our inability to determine precisely why prospector firms experience more financial reporting irregularities in spite of greater audit effort. While we explored several potential explanations for these apparently paradoxical findings, additional research is needed to investigate these findings further. Finally, as noted previously, our results regarding financial reporting irregularities should be interpreted carefully as these irregularities (e.g., AAERs, accounting-related lawsuits, and restatements) are relatively infrequent events.
We make several contributions to the existing accounting literatures on financial reporting irregularities and audit effort. First, we provide evidence that differences in the client business risk of companies' choice of business strategies is an underlying determinant of the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities and thus is a determinant of financial statement quality. Second, our results based on an audit fee model provide evidence that auditors appear to recognize and adjust audit effort based on client business strategies, which is a broader, more comprehensive business risk approach in assessing their audit clients. Business strategy represents features of client business risk beyond what has been represented in the literature using traditional individual proxies for client size, risk, and complexity. Finally, we construct a comprehensive, theory-based business strategy measure that is replicable using publicly available data. This is important because prior measures have required access to management and/or proprietary data. Our study provides evidence that is potentially useful to auditors, regulators, investors, and analysts because it identifies organizational business strategies as an important determinant of both financial reporting irregularities and audit effort. Adaptability to market shift and threat of obsolescence.
Research and development Extensive R&D in order to exploit new product and market opportunities.
Minimal R&D and is usually closely related to current products.
Efficiency Never achieve maximum efficiency in production and distribution systems.
Achieve efficiency in production and distribution systems.
Growth
Growth occurs in spurts through product-market development.
Cautious and incremental growth through market penetration.
Marketing
Strong focus on marketing function.
Weak focus on marketing function while emphasis is on production and financial functions.
Organizational structure and stability Decentralized control to facilitate and coordinate diverse/numerous operations. Focus on product groups. Dominant coalition is transitory and may hire from outside.
Strict centralized control to ensure efficiency and focuses on functional divisions. The dominant coalition is lengthy and tends to promote from within.
Capital intensity Low degree of mechanization and routinization to avoid lengthy commitments to single technological process.
High degree of mechanization and routinization focusing on single core cost-efficient technology. Miles and Snow (1994) provide descriptive examples of companies illustrating Miles-Snow strategic types and we compare some of these examples to our own strategy classification (all quotes in the Table below are from Miles and Snow 1994 (henceforth M&S) , unless otherwise indicated). We also compare our strategy classification to strategic information from corporate websites. In our sensitivity analysis, we replace our discrete STRATEGY measure with indicator variables as follows: defenders are defined with a STRATEGY range of 6-12; analyzers are defined with a STRATEGY range of 13-23; and prospectors are defined with a STRATEGY range of 24-30.
Strategy type Rationale
Our classification (STRATEGY)
Prospector: "Some firms achieve success by being first, either by anticipating where the market is going or by shaping the market's direction through their own research and development efforts. We call these firms 'Prospectors' because they continually search for new products, services, technologies, and markets" (M&S, 12).
"Cisco is differentiated from its peers and has a unique strategy to grow faster than the market. Our long-held leadership position in routing and switching is well known. We work to protect and extend this leadership year after year by investing more in ongoing innovation than do any of our peers. This is a core focus of our business. Our ability to innovate is why customers rely on us as a strategic business partners rather than merely a product technology partner." (Cisco Systems 2010)
Cisco Systems is classified as a prospector and upper-range analyzer during the period analyzed (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 
